Death of the Digital Pamphleteers:
The Possible Threat to Anonymous Political Blogs

“There are only two ways of telling the complete truth anonymously and posthumously.”
- Thomas Sowell1

1

Quotationary 887 (Leonard Roy Frank ed., Random House 1999).

I.

INTRODUCTION
“The Internet has revolutionized the computer and

communications world like nothing before.”2 Not since the
invention of the movable type printing press by Johannes
Gutenberg in 14363 has there been such a dramatic shift in the
ease and speed with which information can be disseminated. In
fact, from the perspective of sheer numbers, Gutenberg was an
amateur. He produced only about 180 copies of his famous bible;4
Internet search engine Google has cataloged over eight billion
web pages5 and it is estimated that over 100 million “blogs”6
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exist.7 While a finished Gutenberg bible took three years to
produce8 and cost the equivalent of three years’ wages,9 today
anyone can set up their own blog or web page in minutes, at no
(or little) cost,10 and it may be instantly viewed by one of the
nearly one billion worldwide Internet users.11

6

A “blog” is short for “web log,” defined as “a web-based

publication of periodic articles (posts), usually presented in
reverse chronological order. It is an online journal with one or
many contributors.” Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog#Blog_Defined (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005). The people who maintain or contribute to blogs
are called “bloggers.” Id.
7

The Blog Herald Blog Count October 2005,

http://www.blogherald.com/2005/10/10/the-blog-herald-blog-countoctober-2005/ (last visited October 30, 2005).
8

Wikipedia, supra note 4.

9

History Guide: The Printing Press,

http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/press.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
10

See, e.g., Blogger, http://www.blogger.com/start (last visited

Oct. 30, 2005).
11

World Internet Users and Population Stats,

http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Oct.

3

These online journals give writers access to millions of
potential readers, far beyond the scope of traditional print
publications.12 And given the relative anonymity of the Internet,
bloggers can, for the most part, hide behind their computers,
insulated from the repercussions of whatever they write.
On a lesser, but no less important scale, the pamphleteers
of pre-Revolutionary America were the bloggers of their time.
Beginning around 1760, hundreds of ordinary people – lawyers,
farmers, ministers, merchants – took up the pen (and the
printing press) to express their political ideas.13 The pamphlets
they produced were quick, cheap, provocative, and, for the most
part, written anonymously.14 Who can blame them, given the
rumblings of revolution on the horizon? In writing anonymously,
“[t]he pamphleteers amounted to the nation’s first underground
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press, a guerilla counterpart to the established newspapers.”15
They had the freedom to write what they believed should be read,
with little regard to possible ramifications.
Today’s political bloggers also have that freedom – for
now. New regulations currently under consideration threaten
bloggers’ anonymous political speech16 by perhaps ultimately
subjecting it to the disclosure rules of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA)17 as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA, or “McCain-Feingold” after the legislation’s
sponsors).18
This paper reviews major legislation and court decisions
regarding political speech and disclosure, takes a look at
political speech on the internet (specifically in the form of
blogs), and examines how that legislation and case precedent
might be applied to force disclosure of the authors behind
anonymous online political speech. Recent regulatory and
legislative action aimed at clarifying disclosure rules will
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also be examined. Given, however, the importance placed on
political discourse in this country, and our long history of
anonymous commentary, the best thing to do with online anonymous
political speech is to leave it alone, and let the reader place
their own value on it.

II.

BACKGROUND
“The lack of money is the root of all evil.”
- Mark Twain19
The Federal Election Campaign Act fundamentally changed

then existing Federal campaign finance laws.20 One of the major
ways the Act revised then-current law was in the area of
campaign finance disclosure. Every candidate, political action
committee (PAC), and party committee was required to file a
quarterly report listing the name, address, occupation, and
business of every contributor who gave more than $100 in a
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year.21 Every individual who independently spent more than that
amount in a year had to file their own separate statement with
the same information.22 The Act also placed on individuals and
groups a limit of $1,000 per calendar year for independent
expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate.”23 The
Act defined “contribution” as a “gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value” made in an
attempt to influence the outcome of a Federal election.24
“Expenditure” was similarly defined.25 The new law immediately
exposed the shortcomings of the previous disclosure scheme:
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reported contributions increased tenfold by 197226 despite the
fact that the Act imposed certain contribution and expenditure
limits.27

1.

A Challenge to the Act
New York Senator James L. Buckley and former Senator Eugene

McCarthy challenged the Act’s compelled disclosure and
expenditure limit requirements in Buckley v. Valeo28 as
unconstitutional intrusions on the First Amendment rights of
free speech and freedom of association.29 While the Court agreed
with Sens. Buckley and McCarthy that expenditure limits were not
constitutional, they found that the disclosure rules had
sufficiently compelling reasons to survive.

A.

Expenditure Limits Limit Freedom of Association

The Court, in examining the limits placed by the Act on
expenditures, did not find that they “serve[d] any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of
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corruption in the electoral process.”30 The Court did find a
“heav[y] burden[]” on “core First Amendment expression.”31 That
burden, the Court reasoned, required a precision in the
expenditure limits that was lacking: “[t]he Court determined
that the definition of independent expenditures was
unconstitutionally vague because the phrase ‘relative to’ did
not clearly indicate permissible and impermissible speech.”32
Accordingly, the Court struck down the expenditure limits as
“constitutionally infirm.”33

B.

Compelled Disclosure is Compelling

Although the Supreme Court warned that the Act’s compelled
disclosure could “seriously infringe” on First Amendment
freedoms,34 it nonetheless found the Act’s disclosure provisions
constitutional. The Court noted three “sufficiently important”
governmental interests that warranted disclosure: (1)
“disclosure provides the electorate with information ‘as to
where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by
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the candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those
who seek federal office”; (2) “disclosure requirements deter
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity”; and (3) “recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data
necessary to detect violations” of the Act.35
The Act was amended by Congress several times, but the core
disclosure rules remained untouched. Later Supreme Court
decisions essentially continued the Buckley reasoning as applied
to disclosure requirements.36
However, “[o]ver time, FECA's restrictions on campaign
funding were significantly undermined by aggressive party
fundraising practices and weak or non-existent responses to
these practices by the FEC.”37 In particular, the FEC allowed
party committees to raise and spend significant amounts of money
on so-called “party-building activities” and on administrative

35

Id. at 66-68 (internal citations omitted).

36

Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of

Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3
Elect. L. J. 251, 272 (2004).
37

The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 21.

10

costs.38 Eventually, these funds—called “soft money”—came to be
used on other activities that directly supported the election of
specific federal candidates.39

Beginning with the 1996 election,

national and state party committees, with negligible objection
from the FEC, came up with a new, more effective way to use soft
money: issue ads.40

2.

Issue advocacy
So-called “issue ads” were first brought to the fore in

Buckley. “[T]he Supreme Court drew a distinction between
communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
federal candidate and those referring to candidates, but not
expressly mentioning a candidate’s election or defeat.”41 Those
communications that merely refer to candidates are more
familiarly called “issue ads.” Issue ads have been termed “a
communication to the public whose primary purpose is to promote
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a set of ideas or policies,”42 and usually are not paid for
directly by a particular candidate. Express ads, however, are “a
communication to the public whose primary purpose is to advocate
the election or defeat of a candidate,”43 and usually are paid
for by a candidate or his agent.
Although the Buckley Court had generally upheld the Federal
Election Campaign Act’s disclosure requirements as applied to
expenditures for express ads, it found that those requirements
applied to expenditures that purchased mere issue ads
unconstitutional.44 In attempting to cure the unconstitutional
vagueness of the Act’s definition of “independent expenditure,”45
the Court interpreted the phrase “relative to a clearly
identified candidate” to mean “’advocating the election or
defeat of’ a candidate”.46 The disclosure requirements of the
Act, the Court then said, can only be constitutionally applied
to expenditures in cases “that include explicit words of

42
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advocacy of election or defeat.”47 The Court gave examples: words
or phrases such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your
ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and
"reject."48 The presence of these “magic words” identified an ad
as one that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a
candidate, as opposed to an ad containing a simple discussion of
the issues. As an example, Buckley would uphold disclosure
requirements in the case of expenditures for ads that said “Vote
Against Smith,” but would strike down disclosure for
expenditures on ads that said “Call Smith and tell her what you
think of her plan to gut Medicare.”49
While in theory this seems perfectly sensible, anyone who
has watched a round of campaign advertising recently knows that
in reality, issue ads do much more than just promote a set of
ideas. For example, in the 1996 Congressional election, Montana
Democrat Bill Yellowtail had a slim lead over his Republican
opponent.50 A few weeks before the election, an ad with the
following voiceover appeared on television stations around the
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state: “Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but
he took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's explanation? He
only ‘slapped’ her. But her nose was broken.”51
Yellowtail was soundly defeated. Since the ad contained
none of the Buckley key language, it was classified as issue
advocacy, and the source of the funds that paid for it was not
subject to any strict disclosure requirements.
The obvious assumption would be that the ad was paid for by
Yellowtail’s opponent; in fact, he denied any knowledge of it.52
It was funded by the Citizens for Reform, a conservative,
Virginia-based group that was formed apparently for the sole
purpose of sponsoring issue ads during campaigns.53 In the late
1990s, such groups were easy ways to funnel soft money towards
political advertising with “total anonymity and no monetary
limits for their donors.”54
Proponents of issue ads believe that it is “exactly what
the authors of the First Amendment had in mind:” “[e]lection
campaigns should be a free marketplace of ideas-messy, robust,
never stifled by regulation. Let the public hear it all, and
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sort it all out.”55 Disclosure requirements, they argue, “would
have a chilling effect.”56 But critics call such ads “stealth
attacks” designed to keep the public in the dark.57 They also
argue that as accountability in political communication
declines, “levels of misinformation and deceit tend to rise.”58
The Annenberg Public Policy Center classified over 41% of the
issue ads aired on radio and television in the 1996 campaign as
“pure attack” ads.59
After years of debate over campaign finance reform,
Congress finally acted. Their solution? The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act,60 or, as it is usually called, “McCain-Feingold”
after the sponsors of the bill, Senators John McCain and Russell
Feingold.

3.

Campaign Finance Disclosure: Round 2
McCain-Feingold amended FECA; as part of that amendment,

the Act established a “bright-line test to identify a new class
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of political communications subject to federal regulation, which
it called electioneering communications.”61

McCain-Feingold

defined “electioneering communication” as “any broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication clearly identifying a federal
candidate that appears within 30 days before a primary or
special election or 60 days before a general election, and which
is accessible by at least 50,000 members of the candidate's
constituency.”62
The Act subjected the newly-defined electioneering
communications to disclaimer requirements: if any group or
individual makes disbursements totaling $10,000 or more in a
calendar year for electioneering communications, a “clear and
conspicuous” disclaimer on the communication63 must state (1)
that the communication was paid for by a candidate if the
candidate, his election committee, or agent paid for it; (2)
that the communication was authorized by the candidate, if it
was so authorized (even if the candidate did not pay for it); or

61
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(3) if the communication was not authorized by a candidate, it
had to state that, along with the “the full name and permanent
street address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address of
the person who paid for the communication.”64 In particular, this
definition of electioneering communication and the more
stringent disclosure requirements were designed to help address
the growing problem of candidate-specific issue advertising.65
McCain-Feingold also made an attempt to reduce the power of
soft money. First, it defined “public communication” as “a
communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising
facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public,
or any other form of general public political advertising.”66
Second, it provided that “any ‘public communication’ by a party
committee that ‘refers to a clearly identified’ federal
candidate and promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a
candidate for that office, ‘regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
[federal] candidate’” is considered to be a “federal election

64

Id. § 110.11(b)(1)-(3).

65

The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 61.

66

2 U.S.C. § 431(22).

17

activity.”67 Federal election activities by party committees have
to be paid for with what is called “hard money.”68 “Hard Money is
money or anything of value that a political committee receives
that satisfies federal contribution limits, source restrictions,
and disclosure requirements.”69
McCain-Feingold’s new definitions of public and
electioneering communication, and the related disclosure
requirements, limited the utility of “sham issue ads” (ads
ostensibly about issues, but functionally advocating for or

67
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visited Dec. 1, 2005).
69

The Campaign Legal Center, Hard Money in A Brief History of

Money and Politics, http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/fhardmoney.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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against a candidate) somewhat.70 However, so-called “527s”
(political organizations formed under Internal Revenue Service
code section 527) that are not registered with the FEC as
“political committees” are not required to disclose money spent
for public communications since they do not receive hard money.71
527s are groups formed primarily for the purpose of influencing
the selection of candidates to elected or appointed office.72 For
the most recent Presidential election, the list of most-active
527s included such organizations as the Sierra Club, the “Swift

70
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Boat Veterans for Truth,” MoveOn.org, and the Natural Resources
Defense Council.73
Under McCain-Feingold, neither the definition of public
communication or electioneering communication contained any
reference to Internet-based speech. In fact, when the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) promulgated regulations based on the
McCain-Feingold amendments, they explicitly excluded
communications over the Internet.74 That, however, may be about
to change.

4.

The Shays Decision
Rep. Christopher Shays and Rep. Martin Meehan challenged

parts of McCain-Feingold as interpreted by the FEC in Shays v.
Federal Election Commission.75 Specifically, the Congressmen
alleged that the FEC’s regulations “thwart[ed] and undermin[ed]
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the language and congressional purposes” of McCain-Feingold.76
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
agreed.
The court analyzed the language of McCain-Feingold vis-àvis the FEC regulations using the standard developed in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.77 The Chevron
rule is used when an administrative agency regulation or
decision that is based on the interpretation of a statute is
challenged.78 Chevron asks a reviewing court to evaluate the
statute for ambiguity; if none exists, “that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”79
Should any ambiguity be found, the agency’s interpretation can
be held valid as long as it is based on a “permissible
construction of the statute.”80 In Shays, the district court
found that the FEC’s decision to exclude Internet-based speech

76
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from the definition of public communication failed both prongs
of the Chevron test.81
McCain-Feingold’s definition of public communication
included, in addition to specific forms of communication, the
phrase “any other form of general public political
advertising.”82 The district court did not find that ambiguous,83
and concluded that “[w]hile all Internet communications do not
fall within the [definition of ‘any other form of general public
political advertising’], some clearly do.”84 However, the court
did not define what specific forms of Internet speech would fall
under the umbrella of “general public political advertising”; it
left that task to the FEC.85
Moreover, even presupposing some measure of ambiguity in
McCain-Feingold, the court found that the FEC’s exclusion of all
Internet communications from the definition of public
communication was inconsistent with McCain-Feingold’s general
aims86 and violated Chevron prong two. Should all Internet speech
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be exempted, the court said, it “would permit an evasion of
campaign finance laws, thus ‘unduly compromis[ing] the Act's
purposes,’ and ‘creat[ing] the potential for gross abuse.’”87

5.

The FEC’s new rules
In response to the Shays court’s ruling, the FEC circulated

a set of proposed regulations aimed at implementing the required
changes.88 The new regulations would only require individuals to
post disclosures on “announcements placed for a fee on another
person’s or entity’s Web site.”89 In the proposal’s explanatory
text, the FEC indicates the new regulation would be aimed at
“paid Internet advertisements . . . if the advertisements either
solicit contributions or expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.”90
It seems that the new regulation, then, would only be brought to
bear on express ads; issue ads would remain unaffected.

87
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6.

Are the new rules enough to satisfy Shays?
Although the current proposed FEC regulations would

regulate paid express advertisements placed on Web sites,91 it is
difficult to see how this will be sufficient to satisfy the
court’s holding in Shays. The Shays court found the FEC’s
regulatory definition of public communication erroneously
omitted all Internet-based communication, given McCainFeingold’s inclusion of “any other form of general public
political advertising” in its definition of public
communication.92 It did so not only because the language of the
statute appeared to mandate its inclusion, but also because a
blanket exclusion of Internet speech would thwart the general
purpose behind the statute.93 How, then, can regulating only paid
internet advertisements that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate be sufficient?

91

Id. at 16,970.
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that one of the main purposes of McCain-Feingold was to “curb[]
issue ads, those special interest ads that clearly target
particular candidates in an attempt to influence the outcome of
an election”) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
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And how should the situation be handled if a political
campaign has in some way funded a supposedly independent
blogger? During the 2004 election, the Howard Dean campaign, as
part of its “Internet outreach,” reached out and paid two
prominent bloggers to serve as “consultants.”94 In reality, it
was most likely done to get the bloggers to give Dean “good
blog.”95 Dean’s “good blog” is an advertisement in the truest
sense96, and one that is, at least on some level, controlled by a
candidate. Such an arrangement appears permissible under the new
FEC rules; there is no strict “announcement placed for a fee.”
The blogger provides services apart from the advocacy - at
least, that is the theory. But no doubt the intent of the
candidate is to generate positive commentary and increase his
standing among potential voters in much the same way an express
ad would. Not requiring some measure of disclosure in those

94

Chris Suellentrop, Blogging for Dollars, Slate.com, Jan. 14,
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Co. 4th ed. 2000)).
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cases would certainly be seen as circumventing McCain-Feingold’s
purpose.
The Shays court did not address whether or not Internet
speech might also fall somewhere under McCain-Feingold’s
definition of electioneering communication; in the plain
language of the statute, Internet speech is not mentioned, and
no express FEC regulation exempted (or included) it. But the
court may have opened the door to examination of Internet speech
as issue advocacy. Since McCain-Feingold regulates issue
advocacy that qualifies as an electioneering communication,97 if
courts were to stretch that definition to include Internet
speech, McCain-Feingold’s disclaimer requirements would apply.
As one writer put it, “[i]f you think of those political blogs
as political ads, then they're worth money-making them subject
to regulation.”98 If a political blog posting “clearly
identif[ies] a federal candidate . . . appears within 30 days
before a primary or special election or 60 days before a general

97
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election,”99 and the value of the message meets or exceeds the
$10,000 limit, the blog might be forced to carry a disclaimer
identifying the name and address of the person who paid for the
blog, even if the posting does not expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a specific candidate. This could
potentially apply to many political blogs. In fact, the
Commissioner of the FEC said that “any decision by an individual
to put a link (to a political candidate) on their home page, set
up a blog, send out mass e-mails, any kind of activity that can
be done on the Internet” could ultimately be subject to
disclosure requirements.100 The anonymous “Wonkettes”101 of the
world would then have to “clear[ly] and conspicuous[ly]”102
display their name, address, and phone number for all to see.
This is troubling, especially given how important anonymous
political speech has been in our country’s history, and how much

99
100
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importance the Supreme Court has placed on anonymous political
speech.

7.

Anonymous Political Speech and McIntyre
In 1988, Ohio fined Margaret McIntyre $100 for violating a

state statute. Her offense? Distributing homemade leaflets
urging voters to defeat a school tax levy. She signed the
leaflets “Concerned Parents and Taxpayers”--not with her name.
Ohio prohibited such anonymous political speech103 in order to,
according to the state, “prevent[] fraudulent and libelous
statements” and “provid[e] the electorate with relevant
information.”104 The Supreme Court, however, took a dim view of
this restriction. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,105
the Court described political speech as “occup[ying] the core of
the protection afforded by the First Amendment.”106 They held
that Ohio’s anti-anonymity provision failed “exacting scrutiny,”
because it was not “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding
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105

514 U.S. 334 (1995).

106

Id. at 346.

28

state interest.”107 “Under our Constitution,” Justice Stevens
wrote, “anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”108 And
in his concurrence, Justice Thomas pointed out that “the Framers
understood the First Amendment to protect an author's right to
express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an
anonymous fashion.”109
But there are limits. The “exacting scrutiny” test would be
satisfied if an overriding governmental interest is at stake. In
McIntyre, the Court acknowledged that Ohio’s stated interest in
preventing fraudulent and libelous statements was nearer that
mark. The Court nonetheless found this interest insufficient, as
Ohio had other provisions in its elections code prohibiting
false statements during political campaigns that it found less
restrictive on core speech.110

107

Id. at 347. “The simple interest in providing voters with

additional relevant information does not justify a state
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she
would otherwise omit.” Id. at 348.
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The Buckley Court said that “deter[ing] actual corruption
and avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption” were sufficiently
strong interests to uphold restrictions on political speech.111
Either of these interests then, applied to anonymous political
speech in the right circumstances, would likely support
regulation of that speech.

111

Buckley, supra note 24. The Buckley Court did provide one

additional consideration for those who wished their
contributions to political speech to remain anonymous: if there
was a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would subject the
contributor to “threats, harassment, or reprisals from
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to an exemption from the disclosure laws. Richard L. Hasen, The
Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265,
270 (2000).
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III. ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND THE INTERNET

112

“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books
have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”113 In
addition to the Colonial pamphleteers mentioned earlier, who
wrote anonymously under threat of reprisal from the British and
their sympathizers, numerous others have used anonymous speech
as a tool for communication. Cato’s Letters, a series of essays
that some call the most influential eighteenth century work on
freedom of speech and political liberty, were written by two

112
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Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
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British men under the pseudonym “Cato.”114 The authors of the
Federalist Papers (and their opponents, the authors of the AntiFederalist Papers), written after the Revolutionary War in
support of the adoption of the Constitution, chose to keep their
names secret. After the American Civil War, many writers on
either side of the issue of slavery chose to keep their
identities hidden, for obvious reasons.115 “It is plain that
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive
purposes.”116
That is not to say that anonymity in itself is inherently
positive. “One who can lie anonymously is more likely to lie
than one who will be identified,”117 and the more readily and
completely one’s identity can be concealed, the greater the risk
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Internet, 75 Or. L. Rev. 117, 125 (1996).
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that the anonymous speech is suspect, or an outright
falsehood.118
The Internet is certainly an easy place to be anonymous.
Aliases can be used; email addresses can be crafted to hide real
names (and even hidden behind special “anonymizers” called
remailers119); a special server called an “anonymous proxy” can
serve as a “go-between” to retrieve web pages for a client
disguising the location of the client and the client’s Internet
address.120 In such cases, only the most technically-inclined
sleuth might ferret out someone’s true identity.
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1.

Can you really blog anonymously?
When it comes to blogging, however, it is much more

difficult to remain completely anonymous.121 Most blogging tools
require at least a contact email address. Even if that email
address uses some sort of technology to mask the real user
behind it, a blogger must still connect to the blog server with
his computer in order to post messages. In establishing this
connection, it is likely the blog server would record the
Internet address of the connecting computer in its logs,
providing a way to trace back to the connecting computer.
Anonymous proxies can mitigate that somewhat (as well as using
public computer systems like those found in a public library),
but connection records from those proxies (or the records of
anonymous remailers) might be accessible, for example, by
subpoena.122 To combat these legal and technological methods of
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detection, savvy Internet programmers are currently in the
process of developing truly anonymous methods of posting.123
In the meantime, of course, most bloggers who wish to
remain anonymous will simply post messages under a pseudonym. To
the general Internet user, this would probably be sufficient to
hide the poster’s true identity.

2.

The Blogoshpere124 and the Rise of Political Blogs
It is unknown exactly how and when blogs began. One of the

earliest acknowledged bloggers was a college student at
Swarthmore, who began compiling an online diary in 1994.125 The
first public blogging service, “Open Diary,” started up in
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Dec. 19, 2004, at 24.
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1998.126 Blog growth was steady, but relatively modest, with only
23 blogs known to be in existence at the beginning of 1999.127
Although publishing a blog was a relatively straightforward
task, it required a working knowledge of the structural language
of Web pages (HTML, or Hypertext Markup Language). Then in the
summer of 1999, free blog tools Pitas, Blogger, and Groksoup
launched. These services provided an easy-to-use Web-based
interface for blog publishing, and the modest growth “turned
into an explosion,”128 with the user base for some services
expanding by 30 percent monthly.129 It was only a matter of time
before blogs devoted to politics would arise.
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The first established political blogs launched in 2001 and
2002.130 Initially rather quiet and unobtrusive, these political
blogs first flexed their online muscle during the Trent
Lott/Strom Thurmond scandal of 2002. At Senator Thurmond’s 100th
birthday celebration, Senator Lott made a remark that Thurmond,
who had run on a segregationist platform for President in 1948,
would have made a good President.131
No one seemed to think much of it at the time; most articles
on the celebration even omitted the quote.132 The remark might
have faded away as a minor blunder if not for the attention of
liberal bloggers. By keeping the scandal at the forefront of the
online political debate, the bloggers eventually drew the
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blogs were andrewsullivan.com, politics1.com, mydd.com, and
dailykos.com. Id.
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Tribune, June 27, 2003, at 1.
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attention of mainstream media. The spotlight ultimately resulted
in the resignation of Senator Lott as U.S. Senate Majority
Leader.133
Recently, conservative political bloggers scored a success of
their own in the “Rathergate” scandal of 2004. After Dan Rather
presented documents on a segment of the “60 Minutes II” CBS
television show purporting to cast a negative light on President
Bush’s service in the Texas Air National Guard, bloggers were
online within hours questioning the documents’ authenticity.134
The mainstream media quickly picked up the story, and
eventually, a CBS investigation led to the conclusion that the
documents were most likely fakes.135 Several CBS producers lost
their jobs, and CBS’s reputation was damaged.136
Since then, blogs and the Internet have grown even more
pervasive as a source for political news. Eighty-four million
Americans used the Internet to get political news on and

133
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participate in the 2004 Presidential election.137 It is estimated
that eleven million people relied on political blogs as a
primary source of information during that election.138 The
influence of online political speech continues unabated.
While the people behind a number of the most influential
political blogs are known, there exist several blogs whose
primary contributors remain anonymous.139 Even on established
blogs whose operators are known, sometimes significant numbers
of individual contributors remain anonymous.140 Given the tenuous
state of anonymous online political speech, their postings, if
they choose not to reveal their names, may be stopped.
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IV.

PROTECTING ANONYMOUS ONLINE POLITICAL SPEECH FROM
DISCLOSURE
“We've heard that a million monkeys at a million keyboards
could produce the complete works of Shakespeare; now,
thanks to the Internet, we know that is not true.”
- Robert Wilensky141
Given the Supreme Court’s rule that disclosure is

permissible, but their stance that anonymous political speech is
to be honored, what is to be done with anonymous political
bloggers?

1.

Shays and Anonymous Political Blogs
The Supreme Court has already articulated a “substantial

government interest” in compelled disclosure for express
advocates: the prevention of corruption.142 That interest extends
to identified as well as anonymous speakers. The McIntyre Court
all but said its holding striking down Ohio’s law prohibiting
anonymous campaigning was restricted to “referenda or other
issue-based ballot measures.”143 The Shays court has ruled that
Internet-based political speech is subject to McCain-Feingold’s
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definition of public communication, and the court may have also
effectively extended application of the definition of
electioneering communication to that speech.144 Where does this
leave anonymous blogs? Barring any future legislative action to
the contrary, they are likely subject to the disclaimer
requirements of FECA and McCain-Feingold.

2.

Application of the Press Exemption
The Federal Election Campaign Act exempts most press

coverage from regulation. It “excludes from the definitions of
contribution, expenditure, and electioneering communication any
communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or
editorial.”145 The FEC grants press entities the exemption if
they are “acting in their usual press capacity” when they
publish.146 The key question is, then, “can bloggers be
considered journalists?”
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Most of the laws in this country that protect journalists
are much newer than the First Amendment.147 They were passed in
recent decades “to protect and foster a specific activity called
reporting.”148 It seems, then, that any blogger, anonymous or
not, who is engaged in reporting should be covered by the FEC’s
press exemption. After all, it can be argued that the reporting
performed by a blogger is no less valuable than reporting
performed by a person for, say, the New York Times. Both are in
the pursuit of information that is essential to an informed
public, an important goal especially in the political process.149
One might also think that a reporter employed by the Times,
working under their code of ethics,150 and trained in journalism
would naturally produce more trustworthy, reliable reporting
than an anonymous blogger. The Jayson Blair scandal effectively

147

Daly, supra note 13.

148
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disproves that notion.151

The fact that a blogger might publish

the fruits of his reporting anonymously does not necessarily
make the information less reliable. A reader can weigh the fact
that the identity of the reporter is unknown when deciding how
much significance to give the information.152
What about bloggers that function not necessarily as
reporters, but as commentators? The FEC does not draw a
distinction between reporting and presenting analysis or
commentary when granting the exemption.153 If bloggers would be
entitled to an exemption for reporting, it would not make sense
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to exclude them from the exemption in cases when the blogger is
offering commentary. And the FEC apparently agrees.
In a unanimous vote on November 17, 2005, the FEC “issued
a[n] advisory opinion extending the . . . press exemption to
people who disseminate news and commentary on the Internet.”154
The opinion was specifically directed at websites created by
Fired Up, a Missouri-based company that runs pro Democratic Web
sites in Maryland, Missouri and Washington.155 The FEC declared
that the websites in question, although clearly politically
biased, “fall within the legitimate press function.”156
Some supporters of McCain-Feingold, though, have concerns.
Particularly, they “fear that party organizations will be able
to take advantage of the exemption for bloggers by launching Web
sites that appear to be independently controlled.”157 In doing
so, political parties could circumvent the controls of McCainFeingold via the Internet. That is certainly a possibility,
although a party would risk a potential public relations
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disaster should the scheme be found out. But those fears are
largely unfounded. The public tends to trust only those news
sources that have been in existence for an extended period of
time.158 While the meaning of “extended period of time” is much
shorter in terms of the Internet than as applied to traditional
media outlets (the Internet as most people have come to know it
has only been in existence since 1991159) it still follows that
those websites and blogs with a significant history will be
deemed more reliable that ones the pop up immediately before an
election.160
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3.

Application of the Volunteer Exemption
“[C]ampaign finance laws [also] allow for a ‘volunteer

exemption’: The amount of money an individual spends on his or
her own volunteer activity is not counted as a contribution to a
campaign.”161 The exemption specifically provides that the use of
personal property at an individual’s place of residence does not
fall under the definition of “contribution” as long as the
amount expended is less than $1,000 per election (and less than
$2,000 in a calendar year).162 Clearly this exemption would not
apply to the big blogs, but home-based bloggers probably can

they should not be entitled to an exemption since any reporting
on the election would fall outside the FEC’s requirement of
“acting in their usual press capacity.” See supra note 146.
161
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breathe easy. The cost to set up and maintain a basic blog is so
low,163 they would likely be covered. The calculation can become
sticky, however, and this bright-line test may not be so bright.
How should the costs of personal computer equipment be
allocated? How about a personal Internet connection? If an
enterprising blogger maintains his own server, does that expense
count towards the limit? If the blog itself is not primarily
political, do you have to apportion the costs by making some
sort of calculation based on the “politicalness” of the blog? If
the equipment used in creating the blog is not exclusive to the
blog or website, does the value calculation take into
consideration what percentage of “non-blog” use the computer
gets? Even though the exemption exists, if someone is near that
bright line, the sheer complexity of figuring out if the
exemption applies might be enough to scare them off.
One of the main problems in applying the exemptions is
that, although Congress has granted the FEC lawmaking powers to
interpret the Federal Election Campaign Act,164 those decisions
are vulnerable to court rulings, just as the FEC’s definition of
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“public communication” was overruled by the Shays court.
Congress can, of course, cure these problems by simply crafting
legislation that draws a better bright-line. However, though
several proposals have been advanced, so far none has garnered
enough support to become law.

4.

Legislative Action
On Nov. 2, 2005, the “House of Representatives . . .

narrowly turned back an effort to exempt all Internet
communication from campaign-finance regulations.”165 Texas
Representative Jeb Hensarling’s Online Freedom of Speech Act166
would have “exclude[d] blogs, e-mails and some other Internet
communications from federal regulation.”167 The bill “would have
. . . allow[ed] corporations, labor unions, and individuals to
spend unlimited amounts on Internet ads supporting
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candidates.”168 Government watchdog groups and some legislators
opposed the measure, alleging that the bill would “bring[]
corrupt, soft money back into federal campaigns.”169 In response,
Representatives Martin Meehan and Christopher Shays (of Shays v.
FEC fame) filed an “alternative bill that would protect bloggers
from government regulation, but maintain the current system
where Internet advertising is subject to the same limits placed
on advertising in other media.”170 The House of Representatives
did not consider that bill, because the sponsors of the Online
Freedom of Speech Act used a special “fast-track” maneuver to
bring the Act to a vote, which precluded any amendments from
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169
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170
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being offered and severely limited debate.171 That haphazard
introduction no doubt doomed Hensarling’s Act.172
Undaunted, however, Representative Brad Miller of North
Carolina introduced a more targeted bill, to amend the Federal
Election Campaign Act to “exempt news stories, commentaries, and
editorials distributed through the Internet from treatment as
expenditures or electioneering communications.”173 As of this
writing, the bill is under consideration by the House Committee
on House Administration. Considering, however, the narrow defeat
of the Online Free Speech Act, the current bill, which protects
online speech without introducing loopholes for online ads (and,
therefore, minus the attendant worries of corruption) would seem
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to have a good chance to pass, and those who wish to post
anonymously will be able do so without fear.

5.

What should be done?
Three options exist to protect anonymous online political

speech: 1) maintain the status quo, and hope the new FEC
advisory opinion is sufficient in light of Shays;174 2) find some
way to apply the FEC’s press or volunteer exemptions;175 or 3)
wait for Congress to do something.176 None of these are
particularly enticing.
On first reflection it seems as though enforcing disclosure
rules on anonymous online political speech is antithetical to
the founding fathers’ purpose in enacting the First Amendment.
After all, shouldn’t “no law” mean “no law”?177 However, as has
been discovered in the 214 years since ratification of the First
Amendment, “no law” really means “limited laws.” And those
limited laws generally make a lot of sense. But here, when
confronted with the same type of speech that was so important to
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the very founding of this country,178 some courts and members of
Congress seem ready to throw a regulatory blanket over its use.
Given the tremendous amounts of money spent on political
campaigns, some regulation, under the Buckley guise of
preventing corruption, is probably warranted.
But not here. Anonymous political speech has a built-in
limiting function: it’s anonymous. Any person reading a posting
written by someone who refuses to give their real name can
simply consider the source, and determine the trustworthiness of
the message appropriately. In the “marketplace of ideas,”
consumers of those ideas can pick and choose among those they
deem reliable.179 It follows that the marketplace serves its
function best if consumers have a wide selection to choose from.
Considering the importance of the speech in question, and
Buckley’s corruption concerns, the most viable option currently
available is Representative Brad Miller’s current bill before
the House of Representatives.180 It exempts key anonymous online
political speech from disclosure, while keeping in place current
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controls over online political advertising.181 The House of
Representatives should act soon to bring this bill out of
committee, and to the floor for debate and vote. Until then,
anonymous online political speech is in danger.

V.

CONCLUSION
“[E]rror of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left

free to combat it.”
- Thomas Jefferson182
In the end, the Supreme Court’s assertion in Buckley that
disclosure requirements serve the purpose of preventing
corruption may be a bit overblown. Perhaps we are fortunate
there was no Buckley rule in the 1760s: the American Revolution
might never have happened. Now, in light of Buckley, McCainFeingold, and especially Shays, online commentators might think
twice about posting a controversial piece, since it may very
well have to be accompanied by their name and address.
Admittedly, preventing corruption is an honorable goal. But the
public as a whole gets far too little credit for being able to
spot a fake. We entrust a panel of ordinary men and women with
the power to declare a criminal defendant guilty or innocent, or
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even send him to his death, but not to sift out questionable
political commentary:
Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They
can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They
can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long
as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that
message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them
to decide what is “responsible”, what is valuable, and what
is truth.183
For those still unconvinced, perhaps Douglas Adams said it
best: “Don't believe anything you read on the net. Except this.
Well, including this, I suppose.”184
If the Federal Government wants to require a disclaimer on
anonymous political blogs, that sounds about right.

183

New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974).

184

Posting of Douglas Adams to alt.fan.douglas-adams (Sept. 13,

1998).

54

